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Remedying Our Fragmented Governmental Structures
to Deal With Our Nation-on-Edge Problems
by Jeffrey G. Miller
Editors’ Summary: The argument against crafting federal regulations for
problems stemming from development in disaster-prone areas (nation-on-edge
problems) assumes that these types of problems are essentially local problems
requiring unique local solutions. In this Article, Jeffrey G. Miller challenges
this assumption, reasoning that a flexible framework of federal regulations
would indeed be effective at remedying these problems. He suggests that such a
framework could be modeled after the Clean Water Act’s (CWA’s) point source
pollution control regime. A permitting system similar to that set out in the CWA
would promote best management practices while still allowing local entities
the freedom to determine which particular practices are most effective for
them. He recommends that we reexamine our conception of federalism before
abandoning hope of federal solutions to nation-on-edge problems.
I. Nation-on-Edge/World-on-Edge
This Article addresses the fragmented and ineffective nature
of government programs and structures presently dealing
with nation-on-edge problems and possible ways of making
them cohesive and effective. This Article could just as well
address the same issues for world-on-edge problems. In-
deed, it might be better to do so, because many of the na-
tion-on-edge problems are manifestations of international
problems, rather than purely domestic concerns. Devasta-
tion from 2005’s tsunami in the Indian Ocean is a world-on-
edge problem and it is international in nature. Once the en-
tire international relief effort is completed, people will re-
turn to their ocean-side abodes, another tsunami will come,
and the devastation will recur. Devastation from annual
monsoon floods on the Ganges Delta in Bangladesh is a
world-on-edge problem. When the floods recede, the people
will return, another flood will come, and the devastation will
recur. Devastation from annual hurricanes in the Caribbean
and Florida is a world-on-edge problem. When the relief ef-
forts are completed, people will return to their homes, other
hurricanes will come the following year, and the devastation
will recur. Devastation from earthquakes in California, Iran,
and Turkey are world-on-edge problems. When the relief ef-
forts are complete, the people will return, more earthquakes
will come, and the devastation will recur.
Wherever we look in the United States, we are on-edge in
some way. But wherever we look in the world we are on-
edge in the same and other ways. Although these natural di-
sasters cannot be prevented, we can act to lessen their im-
pact. For example, we could do the following: (1) try to pre-
vent people from living in the areas most likely to suffer
devastation; (2) have better warning systems; (3) have
building codes requiring structures better able to withstand
earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes; and (4) maintain wet-
lands to lessen the impact and volumes of floods.
II. World Climate Change Problems
The biggest disaster in the making is climate change. Forget
the impact of tsunamis on the island states in the Indian
Ocean, those islands will disappear beneath rising seas
caused by global climate change. Many of the effects of cli-
mate change are unpredictable, but they range from serious
to potentially catastrophic. They are not far distant prob-
lems, they are happening now. Currently, we are relocating
the Alaskan native village of Shishmaref on the Bering
Strait. The village is located on a barrier island, forming a la-
goon between the island and the mainland. “Fast ice”—ice
drifting from the Arctic Ocean and coming to rest against
the shore—usually protects the island from erosion, how-
ever, with climate change, the fast ice arrives much later
and autumn storms are eroding the land under the village,
requiring its removal to the inland side of the lagoon. The
villagers, known previously for their collective ownership
and management of a caribou herd, are now known as the
first American global climate change refugees. Several
other native villages will soon follow. Other effects of
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global warming are evident in Alaska. In summer 2004, for-
est fires in its northern area burned an area as large as the
state of Connecticut. They caused a tundra fire beneath the
permafrost, a fire that like a burning coal seam, is impossi-
ble to extinguish.1
Global climate change is caused by both natural and
man-induced actions. We can do nothing to stop natural cli-
mate change.2 But we can act to reduce that part of climate
change that is man-induced. Climate change is a global
problem and man-induced causes of it are global as well.
Reducing man-induced causes effectively will require coor-
dinated action at the international, national, state, and local
levels. The United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (FCCC)3 recognized the global nature of cli-
mate change and the necessity of a global response to ad-
dress it. But the Framework Convention is not specific
enough to produce action. That was left for later agreement,
consummating in the Kyoto Protocol,4 which contains spe-
cific requirements and timetables for specific countries to
reduce emissions of the greenhouse gases that cause climate
change. The failure of the United States to ratify the proto-
col, however, dooms it to failure and isolates us from the in-
ternational community.5
If we did sign the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Air Act
(CAA)6 would provide an intergovernmental regulatory
framework for us to accomplish the greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions required. The CAA, however, is such a com-
plex statute that it is difficult to use as a model in a short
article. Instead, this Article examines the less complex inter-
governmental regulatory frameworks of the Clean Water
Act (CWA),7 addressing water pollution. Indeed, the CWA
offers a startling contrast in frameworks that hints at suc-
cessful and unsuccessful means of knitting together federal,
state, and local efforts to address pollution and possibly
other nation-on-edge problems.
III. World and Domestic Water Problems
Both the world and the United States are on-edge with water
as well as with climate. The two are intimately intertwined.
Much of the world and much of the United States has either
too much water or too little water. Too much water causes
flooding in Bangladesh, just as too much water causes
flooding in our own backyards. Too little water causes de-
sertification in Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa and not
enough water to go around in the U.S. Southwest. Climate
change warms the polar ice caps, adding to water in the sea,
causing coastal flooding. Climate change alters rainfall,
transposing some of the areas getting too much or too little
water. Water pollution adds to the too little water problem,
making some of the already too little water unusable.
Again, we can’t solve those parts of the too little or too much
water problems caused by natural climate change, but we
can solve part of the too little water problem by reducing wa-
ter pollution.8
At the international level, the Law of the Sea Convention
requires its signatories to reduce land based water pollution
to reduce pollution of the seas.9 But, like the FCCC, its pro-
visions are too general to be effective. Of course, we haven’t
ratified it either, although we have an extremely good water
pollution control system.
IV. The Domestic Point Source Pollution Control
Program
The CWA divides the water pollution source universe into
two categories: point sources and nonpoint sources. Point
sources generally are industrial, commercial, and municipal
pollution added to water from pipes and similar convey-
ances, for instance, the discharge from a sewage treatment
plant.10 Nonpoint sources are all other sources, for instance,
stormwater runoff from a farm. Many sources in the middle
could fall into either category11 and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has considerable discretion to
place them in either category.12
When the U.S. Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, EPA
and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) estimated
that the pollution added to the nation’s waters was about
evenly divided between pollution added by point and
nonpoint sources.13 But it made an enormous difference un-
der the CWA whether pollution originates from a point or a
nonpoint source. The CWA regulates point sources with a
strict federal/state/local scheme that has reduced point-
source pollution by as much as 95%. As a result, waters for-
merly polluted primarily by point sources are largely clean.
In Maine, for instance, 10 out of the 11 waters flowing into
the Atlantic Ocean in 1972 were devoid of North Atlantic
salmon, a native fish. That was because a pulp and paper
mill polluted each of those 10 rivers, with each mill dis-
charging more than the equivalent pollution load of the en-
tire human population of the state. Pursuant to the CWA’s re-
quirements, the mills installed modern pollution control
equipment, restoring the rivers. Today salmon spawn in all
of Maine’s rivers. On the other hand, the CWA does not es-
tablish a regulatory program requiring nonpoint sources to
abate their pollution, because nonpoint source control often
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implicates land use decisions and traditionally we have re-
garded land use decisions as being peculiarly a state and lo-
cal matter.
The CWA’s point source control program has been very
successful. In a nutshell, it consists of:
 a national goal of restoring and maintaining the
physical, biological, and chemical integrity of the
nation’s waters14;
 a permit program administered by states that
EPA determines meet criteria established in the
CWA, with EPAoverseeing the approved state pro-
grams and acting as the default administrator in the
absence of an approved state program (90% of the
states have approved programs)15;
 uniform national standards established by EPA
to be met by comparable industries, based on the
best available control technology for the particu-
lar industrial sector, applied to individual sources
in permits16;
 water quality standards established primarily by
states to achieve water uses designated by states,
again applied to individual sources in permits17;
 regulatory programs by municipal sewage treat-
ment plants to require industrial sources adding
pollution to the plants to meet EPA-established
technology-based standards, programs estab-
lished in permits issued by approved states or EPA
to the plants18;
 a complete array of EPA enforcement authori-
ties, authorizing federal enforcement against viola-
tions of EPA or state-issued permits19; and
 requirements for transparency and citizen partic-
ipation,20 including authority for citizens to sue
EPA for failing to carry out a mandatory duty un-
der the statute or pollution sources for violating
the statute.21
The resulting system is not perfect. States complain about
EPA dominance, while EPA complains about state
underperformance. Environmentalists complain neither
EPAnor states completely perform their duties. Indeed, EPA
performance varies under different presidents. Performance
also varies among states, and varies within individual states
under different governors and attorneys general. But trans-
parency signals to citizens when the government is not do-
ing its job and when members of the regulated public violate
the statute. The ability of citizens to sue EPA when its ne-
glect threatens to make the system break down and to sue vi-
olating pollution sources when the government doesn’t,
helps make the program work and helps to keep the govern-
ment an adequate controller of pollution. Although not per-
fect, the system works and has achieved remarkable results.
V. The Domestic Nonpoint Source Pollution Control
Non-Program
When it comes to nonpoint sources, however, the CWA es-
tablishes no regulatory requirements. The physical means
of controlling nonpoint source pollution are well known.
Buffer zones between waterways and nonpoint sources, for
instance, may greatly diminish pollution that reaches water-
ways from activities such as construction and farming. To
some that smacks of land use control, a matter better left to
state or local governments. The CWA made token federal
grants available for a short period to encourage state and re-
gional governments to control nonpoint source pollution.22
But that program was short-lived and ineffective. When it
enacted the CWA, Congress must have assumed to achieve
the national goal of clean water, state and local govern-
ments, on their own, would take whatever steps are neces-
sary to control pollution from nonpoint sources.
The continued degradation of many of our waterways,
polluted primarily by nonpoint sources, suggests that this
did not happen. To test this hypothesis, one of this author’s
students recently conducted a study of a stream originating
in Connecticut and flowing through three towns in West-
chester County, New York, and then into Long Island
Sound.23 The stream is polluted by nonpoint sources, with
no point source pollution identified. There is no articulated
program to abate pollution of the stream. There is no indica-
tion that EPA is aware of the stream or its polluted nature.
New York has established water quality standards for the
stream and is aware it does not meet the standards, but has
established no program to assure it will meet the standards.
Westchester County is aware the stream does not meet the
standards, but has established no program to assure it will
meet them. Of the three towns in New York, one takes and
analyzes samples from the stream, demonstrating that it
does not meet the standards. All three towns have authority
to control some nonpoint source pollution and all three do
require some controls, primarily on stormwater runoff from
construction sites. Some of their programs appear to be ef-
fective, but they only cover a few types of nonpoint sources
and they are uncoordinated. The end result is that 30 years
after the enactment of the CWA, the stream is no closer to
achieving water quality standards than before. There is no
coherent program in place to assure that it will do so and,
without a regime change, there never will be.
Point sources and nonpoint sources intersect when imple-
menting water quality standards. When a waterway has not
achieved the criteria adopted by the state to achieve the wa-
ter’s designated use, the permit writer must reduce the au-
thorized effluent sufficiently for the criteria to be met.24 If
the permit issuing agency has no authority to reduce
nonpoint source pollution, it must place the entire burden of
achieving water quality standards on point sources. This is
particularly significant today, when most of the progress in
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Copyright © 2008 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
reducing effluent limitations in point source permits is a re-
sult of efforts to achieve water quality standards.25
VI. Can the Point Source Control Model Work for
Nonpoint Sources?
We assume that the point source program model is not appli-
cable or appropriate to control nonpoint source pollution for
several reasons. First, because control of nonpoint sources
involves land use decisions, it faces the constitutional bar-
rier of the requirement of just compensation for the taking of
land or placing restrictions on its use that amount to a taking.
Second, because control of nonpoint sources involves land
use decisions, it faces the political barrier of the traditional
belief that land use decisions are the province of state and lo-
cal governments, perhaps constitutionally so. Third, many
believe that a federally driven program would stifle the cre-
ative juices of state and local authorities. Fourth, the sheer
number of sources could defeat implementation of any per-
mit program. And finally, the command-and-control nature
of federal standards and permit programs seems retrograde.
These assumptions, however, bear close scrutiny because
of importance of achieving the federal, state, and local objec-
tives of decent water quality, coupled with the overwhelming
success of point source pollution control and the lack of suc-
cess of nonpoint source pollution control. The assumptions,
however, are questionable. Where they are valid, modifica-
tions in the point source pollution control to accommodate
the nonpoint source regime may remove the objections.
The first assumption is that the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution26 requires just compensation for con-
straints imposed on land use. Typical governmental takings
of land requiring just compensation are physical takings,
where the government assumes ownership of or physically
intrudes on the property. But it can also effectuate a taking
by regulating the use of land sufficiently to remove its value.
Routine land use regulation does not intrude sufficiently on
the value of land to effectuate a taking.27 Similarly, environ-
mental regulation requiring pollution control measures is
not a taking, for it allows rather than forbids particular uses
of land, by conditioning the use on appropriate pollution
control measures.
The second assumption that nonpoint source controls in-
trude on traditional state and local land use decisions, is the
stalking horse for political opposition to a federal presence
in nonpoint source control. The argued federal intrusion is
questionable on two grounds. First, many of those controls
don’t intrude on land use decisions any more than point
source controls intrude on them. Most of the controls come
after a land use decision has been made. If the decision is to
use land for an industrial plant, the point source control re-
quires the plant to use pollution control technology. If the
decision is to use land for a cultivated farm field, the
nonpoint source control requires the farmer to provide a
buffer between the field and an adjacent waterway. In nei-
ther case does the pollution control requirement intrude on
the local land use decision; it merely provides that no matter
what use is made of the land, controls must be implemented
to prevent pollution of the adjoining waterway.28 Second,
there may be a valid interest in nonpoint pollution control
beyond the state or locality making land use decisions.
Where nonpoint pollution in an upstream state prevents at-
tainment of the water quality standards of a downstream
state, that interest is at its strongest.
Some believe that federal intrusion on state and local land
use decisions actually violates the Tenth Amendment,29
which left states with the powers not specifically given to
the federal government by the Constitution. This argument
was decisively defeated recently in the context of CWA reg-
ulations over storm sewers, imposing requirements very
much like those suggested here for nonpoint sources.30
The third assumption, that a federally driven program
would stifle the creative juices of state and local govern-
ments, is equally questionable. First, the means of control-
ling most nonpoint source pollution are well known. Sec-
ond, flexibility can be built into any system to encourage
rather than discourage creativity. In the point source pro-
gram, for instance, some assume that uniform federal stan-
dards based on the best technology available for a particular
industrial sector stifle creativity in that sector. But the stan-
dard doesn’t require use of the best available technology, in-
stead it requires a pollution control level comparable to that
achieved by the best available technology, leaving the in-
dustrial permitholder free to use any technology it wants as
long as it achieves that level. Indeed, it even allows a two-
year extension of compliance deadlines for innovative ap-
proaches to pollution control.31 That has encouraged cre-
ativity, leading to the development of more effective and
less-expensive controls. Nonpoint source standards also
could allow such flexibility. Finally, flexibility can be al-
lowed in state and local regulatory mechanisms. In the
point source program, for instance, municipal sewage
treatment plants may regulate their industrial dischargers
by issuing permits, but they may also do so by contracts or
equivalent mechanisms.
The fourth assumption, that the vast number of nonpoint
sources defies the ability of any permit program to control,
is based on mistaken assumptions about the inflexibility of
permit programs. Granted, issuing individual permits to all
nonpoint sources would be a monumental task, particularly
if done by a federal agency. But even the point source pro-
gram uses general permits as well as individual permits,32
as does the CWA’s system of permits for filling wetlands.33
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The point source permit program has also become adept at
controlling multiple sources of pollution with a single per-
mit. Permits issued to municipal sewage treatment plants,
for instance, require the cities to regulate industrial dis-
charges to their sewers to meet federal standards.34 Permits
issued for municipal storm sewers may be issued on a
systemwide basis rather than for each sewer outfall.35 In-
deed, storm sewer permits require management practices to
reduce pollution from stormwater runoff, much like the
practices appropriate for nonpoint source regulation.36
Finally, nonpoint permitting systems could piggy-back ex-
isting state and local permit systems. Even now, for in-
stance, locally issued building permits normally include re-
quirements for barriers to prevent silt-laden runoff from
construction sites from reaching adjacent waterways.
The final assumption, that national standards and permits
are retrograde command-and-control mechanisms, begs the
question. Those mechanisms demonstrably work well in the
point source universe. We know the physical means of re-
ducing nonpoint source pollution, but 30 years of experi-
ence has not produced regulatory mechanisms to accom-
plish the task, except on an isolated local basis for subsets of
nonpoint sources. Moreover, when properly understood, the
point source system may not be as command and control or
as retrograde as assumed, e.g., federal technology-based
standards are not requirements to use particular technolo-
gies but to achieve the pollution control performance of
those technologies. If the point source model can be adapted
to the nonpoint universe to achieve water quality goals, why
wouldn’t it be tried, command and control or not, retrograde
or not? Of course, the point source model might be modified
to adopt it to the nonpoint source universe, removing some
of its assumed command-and-control or retrograde nature.
VII. Modifying the Point Source Model to Deal With
Nonpoint Sources
Even though the assumptions underlying the knee-jerk reac-
tion that the point source model is inappropriate for non-
point source control may not be well founded, the point
source model would have to be modified to suit the nonpoint
source universe. Although considerable thought and care
would be required to perfect such modification, an initial
suggestion is possible at this point.
Federal legislation could establish:
 that nonpoint sources must use the best available
means of reducing pollution to water bodies not
meeting water quality standards, according to a rea-
sonable but definite schedule;
 which governmental entity(ies) will determine
the best available means of reducing pollution and
the criteria governing that determination;
 the mechanisms by which the resulting standards
will be translated to regulatory controls on non-
point sources;
 the roles of various levels of government in im-
plementing the resulting program, inducements for
state and local governments to participate, and of
the federal agencies in overseeing implementation
by nonfederal agencies;
 the mechanisms available to the federal agen-
cy(ies) to enforce against violations of the pro-
gram; and
 the mechanisms for public participation in imple-
menting the program, including citizen enforcement.
Considerable flexibility exists in establishing each of
these requirements, although each has bedrock necessities
to be effective.
Different formulations than “best available means” of re-
ducing pollution could be required. The most stringent of
“best available means” or reduction necessary to achieve
water quality standards could be required either at the same
time or in stepped progression. Such dual requirements
would be theoretically more faithful to the goals of the
CWA, although for the sake of simplicity in a large and com-
plicated program it would be far easier to deal with just a
best available means requirement. That would probably
achieve water quality standards in most waterways. If it did
not, the provision could always be amended later to require
further controls where necessary to achieve and maintain
water quality standards. The statute could impose one dead-
line for achieving best available means or it could authorize
regulation of different categories of nonpoint sources each
year for several years, each with its own compliance dead-
line. This would allow regulatory agencies to prioritize ad-
dressing nonpoint sources in the order of their importance in
pollution reduction.
The best available means of pollution reduction for most
nonpoint sources often would be management practices or
flow controls, as opposed to treatment technologies. Many
are well known and readily available, e.g., buffer zones. Cri-
teria for designating a best available means would include
such factors as practicality, cost relative to both pollution
control and the activity requiring the control, and effective-
ness in pollution reduction. These factors could require vari-
ations of a best available means to reflect differences in both
climate and geography. Many of these variations could be
established in national guidelines. Even so, a means of pro-
viding local variations, reflecting differences not consid-
ered when developing the guidelines, would be desirable.
EPA would be a logical choice for developing the national
guidelines, a task in which it is well experienced. State envi-
ronmental agencies could develop variations reflecting their
different situations. This type of presumed national standard
with state variations is already in place regarding water
quality criteria.37 A similar relationship between state and
local governmental entities also appears to be appropriate,
although which local entities are appropriate may vary from
state to state. The two main difficulties here are ensuring
that states allow roles for appropriate local authorities rather
than retaining authorities at the state level, as they tended to
do with the CWA’s §208 program, and ensuring a rough par-
ity in the pollution reduction achieved by variations from
the national standards.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers uses “nationwide”
permits to authorize minor filling of wetlands by common
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activities.38 EPAused “general” permits to authorize similar
pollution sources to discharge in identified geographic ar-
eas, subject to similar pollution controls.39 These mecha-
nisms are actually hybrids of permits and regulations. Like
regulations, they are promulgated using a notice-and-com-
ment procedure. Like permits, they may require individual
pollution sources to file applications or notifications with
regulatory agencies to be covered by them and often require
sources to file compliance reports with the agencies. State
and local governments have a plethora of existing permit
and licensing programs, such as building permits, which
could be modified to include nonpoint pollution require-
ments. These types of regulatory mechanisms initially re-
quire public education, but can be administered efficiently
by regulatory agencies.
Nonpoint source control ideally has the federal govern-
ment establishing program goals and standards, encourag-
ing and overseeing state and local implementation, and step-
ping in where needed to assist or where others don’t act. It
can encourage state and local participation by funding and
providing degrees of implementation flexibility commensu-
rate with the degrees to which state and local governments
undertake program implementation. For instance, it could
allow implementing agencies to adopt control measures dif-
ferent than required by national standards, upon a showing
that they would provide equivalent pollution reduction,40 or
exempt watersheds from controls when water quality stan-
dards are achieved and maintained. The ideal role of a state
is to provide both itself and local governments with au-
thority to implement and enforce nonpoint source con-
trols, develop variations in national standards appropriate
to local climate and geographic conditions, and to de-
velop a network of regional and local governments with
adequate resources and expertise to implement much of
the program. Without direction from above and implemen-
tation from below, nonpoint source control will continue to
be a pipe dream.
Existing federal enforcement authorities are adequate to
address many violations, but should be augmented with
mechanisms that are more suited to a large universe of small
pollution sources. Small, easily assessed “traffic tickets” are
well suited to many components of such a program, mod-
eled on the field citation mechanism in the CAA.41 Allowing
penalties to be used to augment local nonpoint source con-
trols or otherwise benefit the local environment would make
penalties less Draconian and produce real pollution control
benefits.42 Revoking or conditioning other state and local
permits for a violating activity can be an added inducement
for compliance.43 Carrots, as well as sticks, can also be ef-
fective at the local level; rewarding local successes and us-
ing them as local models is as important as deterrence.
Citizen participation has been important in assuring the
success of the CWA in controlling point sources. It provides
citizens with information on how EPA is (or is not) imple-
menting the water pollution program and on compliance by
the regulated public. Citizens provide information and com-
ments on proposed standards and permits. Citizens appeal
regulations and permits not meeting statutory criteria. They
also sue EPA when it fails to carry out its mandatory duties
and sue members of the regulatory public who violate their
regulatory requirements in the absence of government en-
forcement. The latter has proven to be a particularly useful
antidote when some administrations have turned their back
on enforcing environmental requirements.44 The opportuni-
ties for lack of government implementation of a nonpoint
source program and for violations by the regulated public
make it particularly important that robust citizen participa-
tion is authorized.
VIII. Conclusion
The point source control model is known and effective.
Congress adopted it to deal with hazardous waste
management45 and to control air pollution, after attempts to
control it with more flexible approaches failed.46 The same
type of program, with appropriate, interrelated roles to play
by all levels of government, could be adopted to fit almost
any nation-on-edge problem. Indeed, most such problems
cannot be solved by any one level of government; however,
success can be achieved if all three levels are working to-
gether in a coherent fashion. The same can be said for
world-on-edge problems. Climate change and international
water pollution problems, for instance, cannot be solved by
any one nation. All nations who have a part in creating a
problem must work together in a coherent fashion to solve it.
General aspirational treaties and conventions are not suffi-
cient. They must define the goals, allocate goal achievement
among nations, define response mechanisms, measure re-
sults, and prod lagging national compliance. But only na-
tions can implement the resulting programs and if they are
federal nations, like the United States, they probably can do
so only by securing the enthusiastic participation of state
and local governments.
You may wonder how we can get our fractured nation to
work together to solve nation-on-edge problems, and may
wonder even more how we can get our fractured world to
work together to solve world-on-edge problems. The frame-
work suggested above is one possibility, albeit a difficult
one to achieve. However, one thing is certain—if we don’t
solve these problems, like the island nations of the Indian
Ocean, eventually we all will sink into our metaphoric ris-
ing seas.
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